In this article we illustrate the use of modeling and simulation early in the system life-cycle to improve security and reduce costs. The models that we develop for this illustration are inspired by problems in reliability analysis and supervisory control, for which similar models are used to quantify failure probabilities and rates. In the context of security, we propose that models of this general type can be used to understand trades between risk and cost while writing system requirements and during conceptual design, and thereby significantly reduce the need for expensive security corrections after a system enters operation.
Introduction
The majority of practitioners, policy makers, and the general public see computer security as being concerned with finding and fixing, or mitigating, vulnerabilities in software that is insecure. Among the most visible tools of the computer security practitioner are penetration tests (e.g. of web-based systems), fuzz tests of network protocol stacks, identity management technologies, techniques for function extraction and identification, and security patching. Concomitant with the majority view of computer security, these tools are directed at software that already exists. Security, from this perspective, is a problem of finding and fixing flaws in a system that is already in operation.
This view of security manifests itself in the role most often taken by cyber-security within the broader process of engineering, which comprises requirements, design, implementation, testing, and operations and maintenance. The activities most commonly associated with cybersecurity fall within the domains of testing and maintenance. Cyber-security is rarely integrated into activities that generate requirements and designs. Nonetheless, substantial security flaws often have their root cause in a system's requirements and early design. 1, 2 Worse, the cost of fixing problems during testing and operations is as much as one hundred times greater than during requirements and design. By relegating cyber-security to the end of the engineering process, we miss an important opportunity to simultaneously reduce costs and improve security. 3, 4 Here we propose a method for using models and simulations to bring security concerns to the beginning of the engineering process. Outside the discipline of computer security, simulation is commonly used to understand how requirements relate to system performance in the context of a system's mission. Simulation is also used to test the feasibility of early design concepts. The aim of using simulation is to discovery and discard ineffective and less desirable requirements and designs without resorting to expensive prototypes and costly corrections to an operational system. The models and simulations built for this purpose differ substantively from models and simulations that are used to understand an existing system. A principle difference is the source of data for the model. The data inserted into models for generating requirements or designs represent constraints that will be imposed on the system when it is constructed. For example, the model may state a particular false positive rate for detecting intrusions and then use this assertion to forecast the performance of the system under this constraint, e.g. in terms of the number lost production hours. With this information, we can select a balance between lost production hours and the cost of achieving the false positive rate before we build the system to meet this criteria.
This is unlike models used to gain insight into existing systems. These models represent, typically in great detail, the behavior of software and equipment that has already been built and is in use. Data for these models come from measurements taken in the field or from real equipment that is used to drive the simulation. Such data is often plentiful but difficult to use and interpret. In particular, these models are unsuited to asking questions about how a different system would respond to the same data. Consequently, these models are not suited to asking questions about the suitability of new requirements or designs.
If security concepts are to be incorporated into engineering studies concerning requirements and design, then the attendant models and performance metrics must satisfy at least two criteria. First, metrics must clearly relate security, the performance of the system, and its mission. Of the numerous metrics that have been proposed for security (see, for example, the extensive discussion by Jaquith), 5 few accomplish this. For example, the metric of vulnerability density is not useful for requirements or design studies because it cannot be related to the likelihood of a system malfunction during operations. Conversely, the false positive and false negative rates of a technology for intrusion detection can interact with models and metrics for human performance, and the latter often have an important role in simulations that support requirements and design.
The second criteria is that models must be sufficiently abstract that they can unambiguously generate or be parametrized by the selected metrics (e.g. to be parametrized by a false positive rate and to generate lost production hours). Having models at a suitable level of abstraction is particularly important for simulation studies concerning a system that does not yet exist. A recent survey of cyberattack and defense simulations highlights a focus on relatively detailed models suitable for training, security analysis of specific software systems, and discovering effective modes of attack and defense within specific computer network topologies. 6 For instance, the models described by Kuhl et al., 7 Leeuwen et al., 8 and Urias et al. are designed to analyze attacks that exploit specific protocols, 9 operating systems, and software applications, 8, 9 and how an attacker navigates a specific network structure using specific methods of attack. 7 These types of models require information that is generally unavailable when writing requirements or producing a conceptual design and so they are unsuited to informing decisions that must be made early in a system's life-cycle.
Rather, what is required are models that incorporate just those details within the purvey of a requirements specification or conceptual design. Examples are false positive and false negative rates for intrusion reporting, the delay when responding to such an alarm, the rate of change for some variable, and the availability of some subsystem or part. In general, these will be data or metrics that can be stated as a requirement for a design without prescribing how they will be achieved.
Here we demonstrate metrics and models that satisfy both of the above criteria in the context of temperature control for a supercomputer. Building on security metrics and evaluation concepts discussed by Jaquith and Linkov et al., 5, 10 we sketch two definitions of security derived from related concepts in reliability engineering and supervisory control. Models for security technologies are developed that capture their performance in relation to these metrics, and these models are integrated into a cyberphysical model of the control systems that regulate the temperature of the computer.
This development begins in Section 2, where we borrow from reliability engineering to define security in terms of the probability that an attack causes the computer to overheat. In Section 3, we build on this definition by treating security as a problem of state avoidance and defining security as a low probability of entering a state that will lead to overheating. In both cases, a requirement for security is stated in terms of an acceptable probability for the undesired event. We conclude in Section 5 with some of the challenges to building and applying these types of models in practice.
Security as reliability
When designing a system to meet particular requirements for reliability, simulation is used to forecast the relevant metrics and thereby guide decisions concerning design, construction, operation, and maintenance. For example, a manufacturing plant may be required to produce X number of widgets per year with a confidence level of 99%; a circuit may be required to have a 99% availability; or a mobile phone may be designed for a mean time to fail of no less than 3 years.
Simulation can likewise be an important tool for informing decisions about the design and deployment of secure, software-intensive systems. This is particularly true early in the life of the system when designers are balancing the cost and performance of a system's primary components. When considering components that provide security capabilities, their benefits and costs must be examined within the context of a system's mission. A model that integrates the system's mission requirements and its potential security capabilities is essential for this examination.
To illustrate this approach to understanding security, we use a previously introduced model of the cyber-defense of a chiller system that regulates the temperature of a supercomputer. 11, 12 This model has two parts. The first part is the thermodynamic process within the computer, which is illustrated in Figure 1 . Heat enters this thermodynamic system in the form of electrical power dissipated by the computer's electronics. Some of this heat increases the temperature of the electronics and some of it is exchanged with the water circulating through the computer and chiller. The water transports heat to the chiller which extracts heat from the inflowing water. The resulting cold water flows back into the computer, where it is heated again.
For this example we examine the security of the control system and, specifically, the sensor that is used to regulate the flow of water. This sensor measures the temperature of the electronics and changes the flow of water to keep that temperature below 325 K. If the sensor can be manipulated to report a temperature 10 K lower than the actual measurement, then the control system will slow the flow rate of the water. This slows the rate of heat exchange and causes the temperature of the computer to rise, resulting in an unplanned shutdown of the computer approximately 350 s after the start of the attack on the sensor.
Our model for the defense of this control system and its sensor is based on an intuitively appealing decomposition of a cyber-security event. 13 This decomposition has four elements: an attempt to breach security, the detection of a successful breach, the mitigation of that breach, and the consequences of failing to prevent, or to detect and mitigate, the attack. The performance of each security element -prevent, detect, and mitigate -is measured by the likelihood that it will perform its function quickly enough to prevent the computer from being disabled. A successful defense is therefore determined by the speed with which the security controls act relative to the rates of the thermodynamic processes in the chiller and supercomputer.
For the sake of illustration, the three stages of defense are modeled in the following way. The probability of preventing a breach is a uniform random variable p with p ≤ p indicating that an attempted breach has been prevented. Given that a breach has occurred, the time to detect the breach is an exponentially distributed random variable d with mean time to detect μ d . After the breach has been detected, the time to mitigate the breach is an exponentially distributed random variable m with mean time to mitigate μ m . These distributions were chosen to simplify our analysis of the model.
An attack on the chiller proceeds as follows. Upon a successful breach, the attacker manipulates the temperature sensor by adding 10 K to its reports. Upon detecting the breach, the defender restores the sensor to its proper operation. Given values for p, μ d , μ m , and the time t f until the computer is shutdown by overheating, the probability U of a successful attack is:
Equations (1) and (2) may be used in several ways to inform the requirements and design of the system. When writing requirements, an acceptable value of U may be used to define secure for this system relative to this type of attack. Hence, an acceptable design must have U no greater than the acceptable value. When designing the system to meet this requirement, the model may be used to compare alternatives. This is demonstrated in Table 1 for the combinations of notional security parameters listed in Table 2 . Such comparisons may seek to maximize security subject to a budget (see, e.g., the optimization problem posed by Patterson et. al.), 12 separate candidate designs into those that do and do not satisfy the criteria for security, or to assess the value of a new security technology in terms of its expected impact on U .
Security as state avoidance
The analysis above can be extended to consider in more detail the role of the operator and detection system. To illustrate such an extension, we consider how data from the sensor is processed by the software and a human operator responsible for oversight of the control process. Collectively these are called the control center.
The control center watches the control process for signs of an attack, with the operator and security software making separate assessments. The assessment made by the software regarding the presence of an attack can be correct or incorrect. Similarly, the operator's assessment can be correct or incorrect. In this case we assume an attack on the sensor and so a correct assessment indicates that the attack is detected and incorrect indicates that the attack remains hidden.
These periodic assessments are modeled with the discrete event system shown in Figure 2 . This model begins in the observe state and transitions immediately to one of four possible combinations of the observer and software perceptions. The transition probabilities are indicated on the edges from the observe state to each of its subsequent states. These probabilities and the transition rates are arbitrary; in practice, values would need to be selected to match the intended operational environment. 15 These four states are as follows: c c Operator perception is correct and software perception is incorrect. In this case, the software does not recognize the attack but the operator does and takes corrective action. cc Operator perception is correct and software perception is correct. In this case, the software recognizes the attack and operator takes corrective action. c c Operator perception is incorrect and software perception is incorrect. In this case, neither the software nor the operator recognizes the attack.
cc Operator perception is incorrect and software perception is correct. The software recognizes the attack but the operator nonetheless fails to take corrective action.
In each case, the operator requires some time to react to the perception of the data. This time is indicated in the bubble containing the states c c, cc, c c, and cc. In the case of the software and operator disagreeing, this reaction time is quite long as the operator attempts to resolve the disparity before taking action. If the software and operator agree, then the operator reacts swiftly and without consulting other indicators.
The action by the operator is of two types in this simple model. Either the operator takes action to mitigate the attack or the operator takes no action. In either case, the control system returns to the observe state and the above steps are repeated. The action taken upon transition back to the observe state is indicated on the appropriate edge in the diagram: mitigate indicates corrective action by the operator and inaction indicates no corrective action.
An attack is simulated by executing the model until one of two conditions is met. The first condition is that the model reaches state c c or cc before the 350 s deadline. This outcome indicates a successful defense. The second condition is that the model reaches 350 s without entering state c c or cc. This outcome indicates a successful attack. The likelihood of a successful defense may be computed by Monte Carlo simulation to determine the relative frequencies of these two terminating conditions, i.e. the relative frequencies of a successful attack and successful defense. This model has another surprising use. With a change of perspective we may determine how often the security mechanism will cause the operator to make a mistake. For this purpose, we assume that there is no attack and revise the operator actions and terminating conditions accordingly. The revised model is shown in Figure 3 . Simulations of this model have a single terminating condition: upon reaching the state c c the operator has decided that there is an attack and responds inappropriately, possibly causing the computer to be shutdown due to the operator's error.
The outcome of Monte Carlo simulations with both models are summarized in Table 3 . For these simulations, we assumed the transition times are means of exponentially distributed random variables and each model is sampled 1000 times. For simulation of normal operations, the table shows the expected time in days until the operator makes a mistake due to misinformation from or misunderstanding of the security indicators. For the simulation of operation under attack, the table shows the likelihood of the operator using the security controls to successfully defend the computer.
Both forms of this model can be used during design to assess the impact of each parameter on the likelihood of a successful defense and the mean time to an operator error. These parameters may be indicative of operator training, the false positive and false negative rates of an intrusion detection system, the sophistication of the attacker, the dynamical rate of the physical process that is being protected, or some combination of these and other factors.
Recovery and resilience
An understanding of how the system recovers from a cyber-attack is a natural byproduct of the proposed method for assessing risk. With the thermodynamic model that we used to calculate equations (1) and (2), we can also simulate the computer's temperature as it returns to the proper operating point following an attack. The trajectory of the recovering temperature is governed by the physical dynamics of the computer, its temperature control system, and the magnitude of the perturbation caused by the cyber-attack. Figure 4 shows how the recovery occurs for the attack described in Section 3. By accounting for both risk and recovery we have the beginnings of a method for defining and addressing resilience, as discussed, for example, by Collier et al. and Linkov et al., 10, 16 in the context of a specific system and its mission. Moreover, by building models that focus on the system's response to a disruption, without concern for the specific instigator, it may be possible to anticipate and mitigate the negative effects of threats that are unknown. The proposed approach to modeling starts by identifying effects to be mitigated or avoided; in our example, the shutdown of the computer. These are traced back to elements in the conceptual design and requirements that, by being present or absent, could cause the undesired effect; in our example, these are spurious data from a sensor and errors by the system administrator. The simulation model is constructed to capture how the elements lead to the undesired effect. Notably, why the element in question did not behave as desired is not important to the simulation, and this distinguishes the proposed models from prior work focused on attack and defense.
While the use of models and simulations appears promising, it also poses significant challenges. Among the most significant of these are two: (i) conceptual models of cyber-attack and defense that are broadly applicable and (ii) measures of effectiveness and performance that are consistent with these models. In other areas of engineering where simulation plays a major role, there are fundamental concepts and metrics that cut across the field. For example, in reliability engineering we have the concepts of failure rate and repair time and parallel and series connections of parts; performance is measured in terms of availability, capacity, and a host of other metrics. Other areas of engineering -control, safety, logistics -have similarly broad concepts and measures.
These types of broadly applicable models and metrics are absent in security engineering, though some progress towards such concepts and measures is apparent in the recent literature. (See, for example, Jaquith on metrics, 5 together with the metrics and models presented in Leversage and James and Sommestad et al. 20, 21 ) Their future development will play a crucial role in making modeling and simulation a useful tool for designing secure systems. At the same time, research into simulation at the intersection of systems and security engineering will motivate and accelerate the development of security models and metrics.
